Barometer of Repression. Review of Politically Motivated Persecution in Russia in the First and Second Quarters of 2025
Key Findings
- The level of politically motivated repression in Russia continues to grow. In the first half of 2025, there was a notable increase in the number of new politically motivated criminal cases. This rise is partly attributable to the intensifying prosecution of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel.
- The most commonly applied articles of the Criminal Code in these cases are those related to “terrorism” and high treason. Their use is steadily increasing.
- The largest share of politically motivated criminal persecutions occurs in the occupied territories of Ukraine. Within Russia’s internationally recognized borders, the Far Eastern Federal District reports the highest concentration of such cases.
- Legislative amendments to the Russian Criminal Code have continued, further broadening the scope for criminal prosecution and increasing the severity of penalties.
About This Report
This publication marks the beginning of a series of quarterly reports on politically motivated repression in Russia. The current issue covers the first and second quarters of 2025.
The report draws on data from the politically motivated prosecution database maintained by the project Political Prisoners. Memorial. Sources include court records, law enforcement agencies press releases, media reports, and communications from victims and their families. All data is actual as of July 1, 2025.
For the purposes of this review, cases are categorized by the date they were added to the database. Due to delays in public disclosure, the initiation of criminal proceedings often becomes known only days, or sometimes weeks, after the fact. Therefore, some cases attributed to a given quarter may have been initiated earlier. This method introduces a temporal lag but enables a more comprehensive picture of repression.
The Scale of Repression is Growing
In the first half of 2025, the number of newly recorded politically motivated criminal cases increased compared to the last two quarters of 2024. Despite this rise, the proportion of individuals who were deprived of liberty remained consistent, at approximately 70% of all cases.
One major factor behind the surge in prosecutions in the second quarter of 2025 was the growing number of new criminal cases brought against Ukrainian nationals, particularly members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. Overall, 2025 has seen a marked escalation in the prosecution of Ukrainian military personnel, including those allegedly involved in combat operations on Russian territory, notably in the Kursk region.
Table 1. Politically Motivated Prosecutions of Ukrainian Citizens, Including Members of the Armed Forces of Ukraine1 (New defendants by quarters)
| Q3 2024 | Q4 2024 | Q1 2025 | Q2 2025 | |
Number of Ukrainian Citizens Prosecuted | 73 | 129 | 104 | 158 |
Percentage of Ukrainians Among All Defendants | 12% | 22% | 16% | 21% |
Share of Military Personnel Among Ukrainian Defendants | 30% | 29% | 46% | 65% |
Source: Political Prisoners. Memorial.
Most Frequently Applied Criminal Code Articles: “Terrorism” and Treason
Politically motivated criminal charges are increasingly filed under Russia’s “terrorism” statutes and Article 275 on high treason.
The five most frequently used Criminal Code articles in politically motivated cases remained consistent from late 2024 through the first quarter of 2025. However, in the second quarter of 2025, Article 356 (“Use of Prohibited Means and Methods of Warfare”) entered the top five, reflecting the intensified prosecution of Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel.
Article 205: Terrorist Act
This article is interpreted extremely broadly. Prosecutions can be launched over unsuccessful or even alleged attempts to commit acts such as arson of military recruitment offices. Many of these cases appear to be based on provocations orchestrated by security services.
A resident of Svobodny in the Amur region, Korobochka was accused of attempting to set fire to a military enlistment office in Blagoveshchensk. According to media reports, of the two Molotov cocktails he allegedly threw, one extinguished immediately while the other failed to break. After his arrest, he was beaten. On March 12, 2025, he was sentenced to 19 years in prison on charges of terrorism and high treason.
Article 275: High Treason
This statute is being applied with increasing frequency. In many cases, individuals are prosecuted for minimal or alleged connections with Ukrainian organizations, including small donations to Ukrainian charities. Courts often fail to present compelling evidence that the accused engaged in actual cooperation with Ukrainian representatives, raising serious concerns about fabricated charges and entrapment by Russian intelligence agencies.
A resident of the Kherson region, Gulchak was accused of transferring a total of 1,200 Ukrainian hryvnia (less than 2,500 rubles) to Ukrainian military-linked accounts. In June 2025, she was sentenced to 12 years in prison.
Article 205.2: Public Incitement or Justification of Terrorism
This article is frequently used to prosecute a wide range of social media posts, often years old.
A journalist residing in Petropavlovsk-Kamchatsky and Moscow, Petrov was detained in January 2025. The FSB allegedly targeted him due to his professional and public activities. The criminal case was based on a Facebook post from August 2020, in which he shared an article about Russia’s COVID-19 vaccine and commented: “SOON IN EVERY YARD. Inject this vaccine into the Kremlin’s Kashchei already (Editor’s note: Kashchei is an evil character in Russian folklore), let the virus take him.🙄”. Petrov was charged with inciting terrorism. He faces up to 7 years in prison.
Article 205.5: Participation in a Terrorist Organization
This article is primarily applied to those accused of ties to Ukrainian military units that Russian courts have designated as terrorist groups, such as the Russian Volunteer Corps, the Freedom of Russia Legion, Azov, and Aidar.
A resident of St. Petersburg, an individual entrepreneur and a former criminal investigator, Podoshvelev was arrested after allegedly painting anti-war graffiti. He was reportedly beaten and tortured in custody. Authorities found correspondence on his computer with various Ukrainian organizations, including the Freedom of Russia Legion. Podoshvelev said he was seeking emigration options as an ethnic Ukrainian. In addition to charges of vandalism and damage to cultural heritage sites, he was convicted of participating in a terrorist organization. On June 10, 2025, he was sentenced to 14 years in prison.
Article 356: Use of Prohibited Means and Methods of Warfare
This article is increasingly invoked against Ukrainian military personnel. The charges often appear baseless or politically motivated, especially given Russia’s own conduct in the war.
A soldier in the Azov Regiment, Kucheryavy was accused by the so-called “DPR” prosecutor’s office of mortar shelling in the village of Berdyansk. According to reports, no casualties occurred, though three houses were allegedly damaged. In May 2025, he was sentenced to 29 years and 4 months in prison.
Article 282.2: Participation in an Extremist Organization
Despite the ongoing war, Russian authorities continue to actively prosecute individuals under Article 282.2 of the Criminal Code (“Organization or participation in an extremist organization”).The primary targets of these prosecutions remain Jehovah’s Witnesses, who constitute the majority of defendants under this article. Additionally, members of the “Citizens of the USSR” movement continue to be targeted, and recently, criminal cases have been initiated against individuals associated with the “international LGBT public movement”, now labeled an “extremist organization” by Russian authorities.
Declining Use of Wartime-Specific Articles
One clear trend in Russia’s evolving system of politically motivated repression is a shift toward more severe charges and harsher punishments. This is achieved both through ongoing amendments to the Criminal Code and through increased reliance on “heavier” articles.
In 2022, in response to the full-scale invasion of Ukraine, the government introduced two new articles aimed at silencing dissent:
- Article 207.3: Dissemination of knowingly false information (“fakes”) about the Russian Armed Forces
- Article 280.3: Public discrediting of the Russian Armed Forces
These articles were actively used in 2022–2023 and played a central role in politically motivated persecution during that period. However, their relative importance has since declined. By late 2024 and into the first half of 2025, their use in politically motivated criminal cases reached the minimum.
This decline may reflect the increasing dominance of the FSB in political persecution, as “terrorism” and “treason” charges fall within its jurisdiction.
Geographic Distribution of Repression: Occupied Territories and Russian Federal Districts
Politically motivated criminal prosecutions remain most prevalent in the territories occupied by Russia. Notably, in the regions annexed in 2022, the level of repression is significantly higher than in Crimea and Sevastopol.
Among Russia’s internationally recognized regions, the Far Eastern Federal District continues to report the highest number of politically motivated criminal cases per capita, a trend consistent with the second half of 2024.
Table 2. Number of Politically Motivated Criminal Prosecutions Per 100,000 Residents (annualised rate)
| Region | H2 2024 | H1 2025 |
| “New” regions (“DPR”, “LPR”, occupied Kherson and Zaporizhia) | 10,2 | 13,5 |
| Crimea and Sevastopol | 3,6 | 4,9 |
| Far East | 2,0 | 2,2 |
| Siberia | 1,3 | 1,8 |
| Northwest | 1,4 | 1,8 |
| North Caucasus | 1,2 | 1,6 |
| Central | 1,1 | 1,4 |
| South (excluding Crimea and Sevastopol) | 1,3 | 1,3 |
| Ural | 1,3 | 1,2 |
| Volga | 1,1 | 0,9 |
| National Average (Russia + Occupied Territories) | 1,5 | 1,7 |
Source: Political Prisoners. Memorial.
The “Kursk Anomaly”
The Kursk region recorded the highest rate of politically motivated criminal cases in Russia during the first half of 2025, with 15.2 cases per 100,000 residents (annualized).
This spike is largely due to the prosecution of Ukrainian military personnel, who are accused of participating in combat operations in the region.
Legal Developments in 2025
In the first half of 2025, the Russian legislature enacted several legal changes that expanded the scope of politically motivated prosecutions. Key developments include:
- Expanded Confiscation of Property2
Amendments to Article 104.1 of the Criminal Code introduced expanded powers for confiscating property when certain crimes are committed for “mercenary motives.” These include:
- Discrediting the Russian Armed Forces (Art. 280.3)
- Calling for sanctions against Russia (Art. 284.2)
- Assisting in the enforcement of international decisions that Russia does not recognize (Art. 284.3)
On April 21, 2025, Articles 207.3, 280.3, and 284.2 were added to the list of offenses considered “threats to national security,” allowing authorities to confiscate money, valuables, and other assets linked to these acts.
- Criminal Prosecution Without Prior Administrative Offense3
As of April 21, 2025, criminal charges under Articles 280.3, 284.2, and 284.3 can now be initiated without a prior administrative conviction, if the act was allegedly committed for mercenary reasons.
This removes an important legal safeguard that previously prevented criminal charges from being filed immediately.
- Criminal Liability for Failing to Report “Sabotage” Crimes
On May 2, 2025, amendments to Article 205.6 (“Failure to report a crime”) introduced criminal penalties for failing to report the following:
- Acts of sabotage (Art. 281)
- Assistance with sabotage (Art. 281.1)
- Sabotage training (Art. 281.2)
- Participation in or organization of a sabotage group (Art. 281.3)
Like “terrorism” and “extremism” articles, “sabotage” provisions are increasingly used in politically motivated cases.
- Expanded Prosecution Under Article 282: Incitement of Hatred
Article 282 (“Incitement to hatred or enmity”) was amended to remove prior legal limitations. Since July 5, 2025, criminal charges can be filed:
- Without a preceding administrative conviction, if the act includes justification or promotion of violence
- Against groups of individuals acting collectively (e.g., co-signing a petition or publishing a joint post), without requiring proof of prior conspiracy
These changes significantly expand the legal grounds for targeting collective action and dissent.
- Prosecution of “Foreign Agents” Abroad
Amendments to Article 1.8 of the Code of Administrative Offenses now allow “foreign agents” to be prosecuted for actions committed outside of Russia.
Administrative charges brought under this provision can serve as the legal basis for criminal prosecution under Article 330.1 (“Evasion of duties of a foreign agent”).
Conclusion
The first half of 2025 marks a further deepening of politically motivated repression in Russia. Legal mechanisms are being refined not only to widen the net of prosecutable offenses but also to eliminate procedural safeguards. Ukrainian nationals, religious minorities, anti-war activists, and independent journalists remain primary targets. Simultaneously, the geographical spread of repression continues to grow, with the occupied territories and border regions such as Kursk bearing the brunt.
This report is based on publicly available sources and compiled by the Political Prisoners. Memorial project. While comprehensive, it likely understates the true extent of repression, especially regarding secretive prosecutions and detentions.
Footnote
1 Due to the greater secrecy surrounding such prosecutions, particularly those involving Ukrainian nationals, it is likely that not all cases are reflected in available data. The real share of these cases may be significantly higher. This review covers only criminal prosecutions. Civilians and prisoners of war held without formal charges are not included. ↩